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ABSTRACT
In Group Activity Selection Problem (GASP), players form coali-
tions to participate in activities and have preferences over pairs of
the form (activity, group size). Recently, Igarashi et al. [11] have
initiated the study of group activity selection problems on social
networks (gGASP): a group of players can engage in the same ac-
tivity if the members of the group form a connected subset of the
underlying communication structure. Igarashi et al. have primarily
focused on Nash stable outcomes, and showed that many associated
algorithmic questions are computationally hard even for very simple
networks. In this paper we study the parameterized complexity
of gGASP with respect to the number of activities as well as with
respect to the number of players, for several solution concepts such
as Nash stability, individual stability and core stability. The first pa-
rameter we consider in the number of activities. For this parameter,
we propose an FPT algorithm for Nash stability for the case where
the social network is acyclic and obtain a W[1]-hardness result for
cliques (i.e., for classic GASP); similar results hold for individual
stability. In contrast, finding a core stable outcome is hard even
if the number of activities is bounded by a small constant, both
for classic GASP and when the social network is a star. Another
parameter we study is the number of players. While all solution
concepts we consider become polynomial-time computable when
this parameter is bounded by a constant, we prove W[1]-hardness
results for cliques (i.e., for classic GASP).
Keywords
Group activity selection problems, social networks, parameterized
complexity
1. INTRODUCTION
In mutliagent systems, agents form coalitions to perform tasks. A
useful model for analyzing how tasks can be allocated to groups
of agents is the group activity selection problem (GASP), proposed
by Darmann et al. [6]. In GASPs, participants express preferences
over pairs of the form (activity, group size). The activities are then
assigned to participants so as to achieve the best performance for
the whole system as well as to satisfy individual agents. The key
idea behind this formulation is that ideal group size depends on the
task at hand: in a company, an ideal size of the sales team may differ
from that of a web developers’ team.
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However, there is one important feature missing from the standard
GASP model, namely the feasibility of resulting groups. In many
real-life scenarios, smooth communication among members of a
group is crucial in order for different individuals to work together,
and hence one needs to take into account communication structures
among agents. For instance, a group of employers are unable to
realize their full potential if no agent knows each other. Nevertheless,
the basic GASP framework imposes no restrictions on how agents
can split into different groups.
A succinct way to capture such restrictions is to represent com-
munication structures by undirected graphs. This idea dates back to
cooperative games with graph structure, proposed by Myerson [12].
Under Myerson’s proposal, nodes of the graph correspond to players
and edges represent communication links between them. Recently,
Igarashi et al. [11] considered group activity selection on social
networks (gGASP), where groups need to be connected in their un-
derlying social network in order to achieve certain tasks. The focus
of that work was on core stability and Nash stability. In contrast
with similar settings in cooperative games [8, 3, 10], many of the
computational problems were shown to be NP-complete for very
simple network structures; in particular, deciding the existence of
core and Nash stable outcomes was shown to be NP-complete even
when the social network is either a path, a star, or has connected
components of size at most four.
Motivated by the work of Igarashi et al. [11], we investigate the
parameterized complexity of finding stable outcomes in group activ-
ity selection problems. A problem is fixed parameter tractable (FPT)
with respect to a parameter k if each instance I of this problem can
be solved in time O(f(k))poly(|I|) where f is a computable func-
tion. We show that the problem of deciding the existence of Nash
stable outcomes for gGASPs on acyclic graphs is fixed parameter
tractable with respect to the number of activities, thereby solving
a problem left open by Igarashi et al. [11]. For general graphs, we
obtain a W[1]-hardness result, implying that this problem is unlikely
to admit an FPT algorithm; in fact, our hardness result holds even
for gGASPs on cliques (which correspond to the classic GASP).
We then consider a weaker stability concept, namely, individual
stability. In the context of hedonic games, it is known that an in-
dividually stable solution always exists and can be computed in
polynomial time when the communication structure is acyclic [10].
In contrast, we show that an instance of gGASP may have no in-
dividually stable outcomes, even if the underlying network is a
path. We then analyze the complexity of computing individually
stable solutions, and discover that from an algorithmic point of view
individual stability is very similar to Nash stability.
Unfortunately, our FPT results do not extend to core stability: we
prove that checking the existence of core stable assignments is NP-
complete even for gGASPs on stars with two activities; for classic
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Table 1: Overview of our complexity results. ‘NS’ stands for Nash stability, ‘IS’ stands for individual stability, ‘CR’ stands for core
stability. All W[1]-hardness results are accompanied by XP-membership proofs except for finding an individually stable assignment
in GASPs on cliques. For all ‘XP’-entries, the question whether the problem is fixed-parameter tractable remains open. ♦ indicates
that the result is not directly stated, but follows indirectly. New results are listed in boldface font.
Complexity (general case) few activities (FPT wrt p) few players (FPT wrt n) copyable activities
NS cliques NP-c. [5] W[1]-h. (Th. 2) W[1]-h. (Th. 15) NP-c. [2]
acyclic NP-c. [11] FPT (Th. 1) XP (Obs. 14) poly time [11]
paths NP-c. [11] FPT [11] XP (Obs. 14) poly time [11]
stars NP-c. [11] FPT [11] XP (Obs. 14) poly time [11]
small components NP-c.[11] FPT [11] XP (Obs. 14) poly time [11]♦
IS cliques NP-c. [5] W[1]-h. (Th. 6) W[1]-h. (Th. 15) NP-c. [2]
acyclic NP-c. (Th. 5) FPT (Th. 7) XP (Obs. 14) poly time (Th. 4)
paths NP-c. (Th. 5) FPT (Th. 7) XP (Obs. 14) poly time (Th. 4)
stars NP-c. (Th. 5) FPT (Th. 7) XP (Obs. 14) poly time (Th. 4)
small components NP-c. (Th. 5) FPT [11]♦ XP (Obs. 14) poly time [11]♦
CR cliques NP-c. [5] NP-c. for p = 4 (Th. 10) W[1]-h. (Th. 15) NP-c. [2]
acyclic NP-c. [11] NP-c. for p = 2 (Th. 9) XP (Obs. 14) poly time [7]
paths NP-c. [11] XP (Cor. 13) XP (Obs. 14) poly time [7]
stars NP-c. [11] NP-c. for p = 2 (Th. 9) XP (Obs. 14) poly time [7]
small components NP-c. [11] FPT [11] XP (Obs. 14) poly time [11]♦
GASP, we can prove that this problem is hard if there are at least
four activities. On the other hand, if there is only one activity, a core
stable assignment always exists and can be constructed efficiently,
for any network structure.
Another parameter we consider is the number of players. Some-
what surprisingly, we show that this parameterization does not give
rise to an FPT algorithm for gGASPs on general networks. Specifi-
cally, for all stability notions we consider, it is W[1]-hard to decide
the existence of a stable outcome even when the underlying graph is
a clique. We summarize our complexity results in Table 1.
2. MODEL
For s, t ∈ N ∪ {0} where s ≤ t, let [s] = {1, 2, . . . , s} and
[s, t] = {s, s + 1, . . . , t}. We start by defining a group activity
selection problem with a graph structure [11].
DEFINITION 1 (gGASP). An instance of the Group Activity
Selection Problem with graph structure (gGASP) is given by a finite
set of players, or agents, N = [n], a finite set of activities A =
A∗∪{a∅} whereA∗ = {a1, a2, . . . , ap} and a∅ is the void activity,
a profile (i)i∈N of complete and transitive preference relations
over the set of alternatives X = A∗ × [n] ∪ {(a∅, 1)}, as well as
a set of communication links between players L ⊆ {{i, j} | i, j ∈
N ∧ i 6= j }.
In what follows, we will write x i y or i : x  y to indicate that
player i strictly prefers alternative x to alternative y; similarly, we
will write x ∼i y or i : x ∼ y if i is indifferent between x and y.
Also, given two sets of alternatives X,Y and a player i, we write
X i Y to indicate that i is indifferent among all alternatives in X
as well as among all alternatives in Y , and prefers each alternative
in X to each alternative in Y .
Two non-void activities a and b are said to be equivalent if for
each player i ∈ N and every ` ∈ [n] it holds that (a, `) ∼i (b, `).
A non-void activity a ∈ A∗ is called copyable if A∗ contains at
least n activities that are equivalent to a (including a itself). Player
i ∈ N is said to approve an alternative (a, k) if (a, k) i (a∅, 1).
When describing a player’s preferences, by convention we only list
the alternatives that she approves as well as (a∅, 1).
An outcome of a gGASP is a feasible assignment of activities
A to players N , i.e., a mapping pi : N → A where for each
a ∈ A∗ the set pia = { i ∈ N | pi(i) = a } of players assigned
to a is connected in (N,L). Note that we place no constraints
on the set of players who can simultaneously engage in the void
activity (i.e., do nothing). For i ∈ N with pi(i) 6= a∅, we let
pii = {i} ∪ { j ∈ N | pi(j) = pi(i)} denote the set of players
assigned to the same activity as player i ∈ N ; for i ∈ N with
pi(i) = a∅, we set pii = {i}.
A feasible assignment pi : N → A of a gGASP is individually
rational (IR) if each player weakly prefers her own activity to doing
nothing, i.e.(pi(i), |pii|) i (a∅, 1) for all i ∈ N .
A subset S ⊆ N of players is called a coalition, and said to be
feasible if it is connected in the graph (N,L).
A feasible coalition S ⊆ N and an activity a ∈ A∗ strongly block
an assignment pi : N → A if pia ⊆ S and (a, |S|) i (pi(i), |pii|)
for all i ∈ S. A feasible assignment pi : N → A of a gGASP is
called core stable (CR) if it is individually rational, and there is no
feasible coalition S ⊆ N and activity a ∈ A∗ such that S and a
strongly block pi. Given a feasible assignment pi : N → A of a
gGASP, a player i ∈ N is said to have
• an NS-deviation to activity a ∈ A∗ if pia ∪ {i} is connected,
and i strictly prefers to join the group pia, i.e., (a, |pia|+1) i
(pi(i), |pii|).
• an IS-deviation if it is an NS-deviation, and all players in pia
accept it, i.e., (a, |pia|+ 1) j (a, |pia|) for all j ∈ pia.
A feasible assignment pi : N → A of a gGASP is called Nash
stable (NS) (respectively, individually stable (IS)) if it is individually
rational and no player i ∈ N has an NS-deviation (respectively, an
IS-deviation) to some a ∈ A∗.
3. NASH STABILITY
The first stability concept we will consider is Nash stability. The
following example, due to Igarashi et al. [11], shows that Nash stable
outcomes may not exist even in very simple instances of gGASP.
EXAMPLE 1 (STALKER GAME). We consider an instance of
gGASP with two players: one is a loner and another is a stalker. The
loner only approves alternatives of the form (a, 1), where a ∈ A∗,
and the stalker only approves alternatives of the form (a, 2), where
a ∈ A∗. Clearly, no assignment for this instance is Nash stable:
if a loner engages in an activity alone, the stalker would wish to
join, and if the loner and the stalker are together, the loner prefers to
deviate to a∅.
Igarashi et al. [11] show that it is NP-complete to decide if a
given instance of gGASP admits a Nash stable outcome, even if
the underlying graph (N,L) is a path or a star; on the other hand,
they demonstrate that for paths and stars the problem of finding a
Nash stable outcome is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the
number of activities. We will now show that this FPT result extends
to arbitrary acyclic networks.
THEOREM 1. The problem of deciding whether an instance of
gGASP with |A∗| = p whose underlying social network (N,L) is
acyclic has a Nash stable feasible assignment and finding one if it
exists is in FPT with respect to p.
PROOF. We will first present a proof for the case where (N,L) is
a tree; in the end, we will show how to extend the result to arbitrary
forests. Fix an instance (N,A, (i)i∈N , L) of gGASP such that
(N,L) is a tree. We choose an arbitrary node inN as the root of this
tree, thereby making (N,L) a rooted tree; we denote byC(i) the set
of children of i and by D(i) the set of descendants of i (including i
herself).
We process the nodes from the leaves to the root. For each i ∈ N ,
each B ⊆ A∗, each B′ ⊆ B, each (a, k) ∈ B′ × [n] ∪ {(a∅, 1)}
and each t ∈ [k], we let fi(B,B′, (a, k), t) be true if there is an
assignment pi : N → A where
• the set of activities assigned to players in D(i) is exactly B′;
• player i is assigned to a and is in a coalition with k other
players;
• exactly t players in D(i) belong to the same group as i;
• the t players in D(i) ∩ pii weakly prefer (a, k) to (b, 1) for
each b ∈ A \B, and have no incentive to deviate to the other
groups, i.e., every player in D(i) ∩ pii whose children do
not belong to pii likes (a, k) at least as much as each of the
alternatives she can deviate to;
• the players in D(i) \ pii weakly prefer their alternative under
pi to engaging alone in any of the activities in A \B, have no
NS deviation to activities in B′ \ {a}, and have no incentive
to deviate to i’s coalition, i.e., if a 6= a∅, then every player
j ∈ D(i) \ pii whose parent belongs to pii likes (pi(j), |pij |)
at least as much as (a, k + 1).
Otherwise, we let fi(B,B′, (a, k), t) be false.
By construction, our instance admits a Nash stable assignment if
and only if fr(B,B′, (a, k), k) is true for some combination of the
arguments B,B′, and (a, k), where r is the root.
If i is a leaf, we set fi(B,B′, (a, k), t) to true if B′ = {a},
t = 1, and i weakly prefers (a, k) to every alternative (b, 1) such
that b ∈ A \B; otherwise, we set fi(B,B′, (a, k), t) to false. Now,
consider the case where i is an internal vertex. We first check
whether i strictly prefers some alternative (b, 1) such that b ∈ A\B
to (a, k); if so, we set fi(B,B′, (a, k), t) to false. Otherwise, we
proceed and check for each partition P of B′ \ {a} whether there is
an allocation of each activity set P ∈ P to some subtree rooted at i’s
child that gives rise to an assignment with the conditions described
above.
We do this by using the color-coding technique; we ‘color’ each
child of i using colors from P independently and uniformly at
random. Suppose that pi is an assignment satisfying the properties
described above where each activity set P ∈ P is assigned to D(j)
for some j ∈ C(i); we denote by S the set of i’s children whose
subtrees are assigned to some P ∈ P . Then, the probability that
the subtrees associated with S are assigned to these activities by a
coloring χ chosen at random is |P|−|P|, since there are |P||C(i)|
possible colorings, and |P||C(i)|−|P| of them coincide with pi on S.
We can then derandomize our algorithm using a family of k-perfect
hash functions [1].
Now, let us fix a coloring χ : C(i) → P . For each P ∈ P , we
denote by CP = { j ∈ C(i) | χ(j) = P } the set of i’s children of
color P . We seek to assign each subtree rooted at the j-th element
of C(i) to the activities χ(j) ∪ {a, a∅} in such a way that exactly
one subtree of each color P ∈ P uses all the activities in P . We will
show that there exists an efficient algorithm that finds an assignment
compatible with χ, or determines that no such assignment exists.
We will first determine for each color P ∈ P , each j ∈ CP , and
each ` ∈ [0, k − 1] whether the subtree rooted at j can be assigned
to the activity set P , and exactly ` players in the subtrees of CP
can be assigned to a; we refer to this subproblem by fP (j, `). We
initialize fP (j, `) to true if
• ` = 0, and i and j can be separated from each other, that is,
there exists an alternative (b, `) ∈ P × [n] ∪ {(a∅, 1)} such
that (i.) fj(B,P, (b, `), `) is true, (ii.) b = a∅ or i weakly
prefers (a, k) to (b, ` + 1), and (iii.) a = a∅ or j weakly
prefers (b, `) to (a, k + 1); or
• ` ≥ 1, and fj(B,P ∪ {a}, (a, k), `) is true.
We set fP (j, `) to false otherwise. Then, we iterate through all the
subtrees associated with players in CP \ {j} and update fP (j, `):
for each j′ ∈ CP \ {j} and for ` = k − 1, k − 2, . . . , 0, we set
fP (j, `) to true if
• ` ≥ 2, and, moreover, there exists an x ∈ [`] such that both
fj′(B, {a}, (a, k), x) and fP (j, `− x) are true; or
• both fj′(B, ∅, (a∅, 1), 1) and fP (j, `) are true, and a = a∅
or player j′ weakly prefers (a∅, 1) to (a, k + 1);
we set fP (j, `) to false otherwise.
In a similar manner, we determine whether exactly ` successors
of i can be assigned to activity a; we denote this problem by f(`).
We initialize f(1) to true and f(`) to false for each ` ∈ [2, t]. We
iterate through all the colors in P and update f(`) one by one; for
each color P ∈ P and each number ` = t, t − 1, . . . , 1, we set
f(`) to true if there exists x ∈ [0, t− 1] such that fP (j, x) is true
for some j ∈ CP and f(` − x) is true, and we set f(`) to false
otherwise. Finally, we reject the coloring χ if f(t) is false. Clearly,
if there exists a Nash stable feasible assignment that is compatible
with χ, then the algorithm does not reject the coloring. We omit the
proof for the bound on the running time.
Now, if (N,L) is a forest, we can combine the algorithm de-
scribed above with the algorithm for graphs with small connected
components proposed by Igarashi et al. [11]. The running time
of the latter algorithm is a product of the time required to find a
Nash stable assignment for a single connected component and the
time required to combine solutions for different components; in the
analysis of Igarashi et al., the former is O(pc), where c is the maxi-
mum component size and the latter is O(8pn3). In our case, each
connected component is a tree, so instead of the O(pc) algorithm
for general graphs we can use our FPT algorithm for trees. This
shows that our problem is in FPT for arbitrary forests.
It is unlikely that Theorem 1 can be extended to general graphs
or even cliques: our next result shows that the problem of finding
a Nash stable outcome is W[1]-hard with respect to the number
of activities even for ‘vanilla’ GASP, i.e., when the social network
imposes no constraints on possible coalitions.
THEOREM 2. The problem of determining whether an instance
of gGASP admits a Nash stable assignment is W[1]-hard with
respect to the number of activities, even if the underlying graph
G = (N,L) is a clique.
PROOF. We reduce from CLIQUE on regular graphs, which is
known to be W[1]-hard (see e.g. Theorem 13.4 in the book of
Cygan [4]). Given a graph G = (V,E) and an integer k, where
|V | = n, |E| = m, and each vertex of G has degree δ ≥ k− 1, we
create an instance of gGASP whose underlying graph is a clique, as
follows.
We define the set of activities as
A = A′ ∪B′ ∪ {x, a∅},
where |A′| = k, |B′| = k(k− 1)/2. Notice that |A∗| = |A| − 1 =
1 + k(k + 1)/2.
For each v ∈ V , we create a vertex player v, and for each edge
e = {u, v} ∈ E, we create two edge players euv and evu. Let
X = {j(k+3)+2+δ | j ∈ [n]}, and let α : V → X be a bijection
that assigns a distinct number in X to each vertex v ∈ V . Note
that α(u) < α(v) implies that the intervals [α(u), α(u) + k + 1]
and [α(v)− 1, α(v) + k] are disjoint. Similarly, let Y = {1 + 2j |
j ∈ [m]} and let β : E → Y be a bijection that assigns a distinct
number in Y to each edge e ∈ E. For each v ∈ V we construct
a set of α(v)− δ + k − 2 dummy players Dv; similarly, for each
e ∈ E we construct a set of β(e)− 2 dummy players De. We let
NG = V ∪
⋃
v∈V
Dv ∪
⋃
e={u,v}∈E
{euv, evu} ∪De.
Finally, we create five additional players {b1, b2, c1, c2, g} and let
N = NG ∪ {b1, b2, c1, c2, g};
intuitively, b1, b2 and c1, c2 will form two instances of the stalker
game, with g used to stabilize the latter. Let L be the set of pairs of
distinct players of N . Note that |A∗| depends on k, but not on n,
and the size of our instance of gGASP is bounded by O(n3 +m2).
We will now define the players’ preferences. Each vertex player
v ∈ V and the players in Dv approve each alternative in A′ ×
[α(v), α(v)+k+1]. Each edge player evu approves each alternative
in A′ × [α(v), α(v) + k + 1] as well as each alternative in B′ ×
{β(e)}, whereas its dummies only approve the alternatives in B′ ×
{β(e)}. All of these players are indifferent among all alternatives
they approve. The stabilizer g approves each alternative of the form
(a, s) with a ∈ A′, s ∈ ⋃v∈V [α(v) + 2, α(v) + k + 2] and is
indifferent among them; she also approves (x, 3), but likes it less
than all other approved alternatives. Also, we have
c1 : (x, 1) ∼ (x, 3)  (a∅, 1), c2 : (x, 2) ∼ (x, 3)  (a∅, 1),
b1 : A
′ × {1}  (a∅, 1), b2 : A′ × {2}  (a∅, 1).
We will now argue that the graph G contains a clique of size k if
and only if there exists a Nash stable assignment for our instance of
gGASP. Suppose that G contains a clique S of size k. We construct
an assignment pi as follows. We establish a bijection η between S
and A′, and for each v ∈ V we form a coalition of size α(v) that
engages in η(v): this coalition consists of v, all players in Dv , and
all edge players evu such that u 6∈ S. Also, we establish a bijection
ξ between the edge set { {u, v} ∈ E | u, v ∈ S } and B′, and
assign the activity ξ(e) to the edge players euv , evu as well as to
all players in De. Finally, we set pi(c1) = pi(c2) = pi(g) = x, and
assign the void activity to the remaining players. We will now argue
that the resulting assignment pi is Nash stable.
Clearly, no player assigned to an activity in A′ or B′ wishes
to deviate. Now, consider a player v ∈ N with pi(v) = a∅; by
construction, v only wants to join a coalition if it engages in an
activity in A′ and its size is in the interval [α(v) − 1, α(v) + k],
and no such coalition exists. The same argument applies to players
in Dv . Similarly, consider an edge player evu with pi(evu) = a∅.
We have u, v 6∈ S, and therefore evu does not want to join any of
the existing coalitions; the same argument applies to all dummies
of evu. Further, b1 and b2 do not want to deviate since each activity
a ∈ A′ is assigned to at least three players, and players c1 and c2 do
not want to deviate since they are allocated one of their top choices.
Finally, the stabilizer g does not want to deviate, since there is no
coalition of size s ∈ ⋃v∈V [α(v) + 1, α(v) + k + 1] that engages
in an activity a ∈ A′. Hence, pi is Nash stable.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a Nash stable feasible assign-
ment pi. Notice that pi cannot allocate an activity a ∈ A′ to b1 or b2,
or leave it unallocated, since no such assignment can be Nash stable.
Thus, each activity in A′ is allocated to a coalition whose size lies in
the interval [α(v), α(v)+k+1] for some v ∈ V . Further, Nash sta-
bility implies that pi allocates x to c1, c2 and g. Now, if some activity
a ∈ A′ is assigned to s players, where s ∈ [α(v)+1, α(v)+k+1]
for some v ∈ V , the stabilizer g would then deviate to that coalition;
hence, for each a ∈ A′ we have |pia| = α(v) for some v ∈ V . Now,
let S = {v ∈ V | α(v) = |pia| for some a ∈ A′}. By construction,
|S| = k. We will show that S is a clique.
Consider a player v ∈ S, and let a(v) be the activity assigned
to α(v) players under pi. We have pi(v) = a(v), since otherwise
v could deviate to a; similarly, all players in Dv are assigned to a.
The only other players who approve (a(v), α(v)) are edge players
evu. Thus, δ−k+1 such players must be assigned to a(v), and the
remaining k − 1 of these players must be assigned to some activity
b ∈ B′, since otherwise they would deviate to a(v). Now, consider
an edge player evu with pi(evu) = b for some b ∈ B′. By individual
rationality we have pib = β({u, v}) and hence pib consists of evu,
euv and all dummies of the edge {u, v}.
For each v ∈ S, consider the set of players Epi,v = {evu, euv |
v ∈ S, pi(evu) 6= pi(v)}. The size of this set is 2(k − 1), and
we have argued that all players in such sets need to be assigned to
activities in B′. However, |B′| = k(k − 1)/2, and each activity
in B′ can be assigned to at most two edge players simultaneously.
Thus, |⋃v∈S Epi,v| = k(k − 1). As each edge player euw ∈⋃
v∈S Epi,v can belong to at most two sets Epi,v , it follows that it
belongs to exactly two such sets, namely, Epi,u and Epi,w. Thus,
both u and w are in S, i.e., S is a clique, which is what we wanted
to prove.
On the positive side, for gGASPs on cliques, we can place the
problem of finding a Nash stable assignment in the complexity class
XP with respect to the number of activities. However, it is not clear
if this result can be extended to general gGASPs.
THEOREM 3. There exist an algorithm that, given an instance
(N,A, (i)i∈N , L) of gGASP with |N | = n, |A| = p + 1 such
that (N,L) is a clique, determines whether it admits a Nash stable
assignment in time (n+ 1)ppoly(n).
PROOF. For every mapping f : A∗ → [0, n], we will check if
there is a Nash stable assignment such that |pia| = f(a) for each
a ∈ A∗. There are at most (n + 1)p such mappings; hence, it
remains to show that each check will take at most poly(n) steps.
Fix a mapping f : A∗ → [0, n]. We construct an instance of
the network flow problem as follows. We introduce a source s,
a sink t, a node i for each player i ∈ N , and a node a for each
activity a ∈ A∗. We create an arc with unit capacity from the
source s to each player, and an arc with capacity f(a) from node
a ∈ A∗ to the sink t. Then, for each i ∈ N we create an arc of unit
capacity from player i to an activity a ∈ A∗ if and only if i weakly
prefers (a, f(a)) to (a∅, 1) and to all pairs of the form (b, f(b)+1),
where b ∈ A∗ \ {a}. It can be easily verified that an integral flow
of size
∑
a∈A∗ f(a) in this network corresponds to a Nash stable
assignment where exactly f(a) players are engaged in each activity
a ∈ A∗. It remains to note that one can check in polynomial time
whether a given network admits a flow of a given size.
4. INDIVIDUAL STABILITY
We will next consider a less stringent stability requirement, namely,
individual stability. Igarashi and Elkind [10] showed that in the
context of hedonic games, acyclicity is sufficient for individually
stable outcomes to exist: an individually stable partition of players
always exists and can be computed in polynomial time. In contrast, it
turns out that for gGASPs this is not the case: an individually stable
outcome may fail to exist even if the underlying social network is a
path; moreover, this may happen even if there are only three players
and their preferences are strict.
EXAMPLE 2. Consider a gGASP with N = {1, 2, 3}, A∗ =
{x, y, z}, L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, where players’ preferences are as
follows:
1 : (b, 2)  (a, 1)  (c, 3)  (c, 2)  (c, 1)  (a∅, 1)
2 : (c, 3)  (c, 2)  (a, 2)  (b, 2)  (b, 1)  (a∅, 1)
3 : (c, 3)  (a, 2)  (a, 1)  (a∅, 1)
We will argue that each individually rational feasible assignment
pi admits an IS-deviation. Indeed, if pi(1) = a∅ then no player
is engaged in c and hence player 1 can deviate to c. Similarly, if
pi(2) = a∅ then no player is engaged in b and hence player 2 can
deviate to b. There are 9 individually rational feasible assignments
where pi(1) 6= a∅, pi(2) 6= a∅; for each of them we can find an IS
deviation as follows (we write i→ x to indicate that player i has an
IS-deviation to activity x):
(1) pi(1) = a, pi(2) = b, pi(3) = a∅: 1→ b;
(2) pi(1) = b, pi(2) = b, pi(3) = a∅: 3→ a;
(3) pi(1) = b, pi(2) = b, pi(3) = a: 2→ a;
(4) pi(1) = c, pi(2) = a, pi(3) = a: 2→ c;
(5) pi(1) = c, pi(2) = b, pi(3) = a∅: 3→ a;
(6) pi(1) = c, pi(2) = b, pi(3) = a: 2→ a;
(7) pi(1) = c, pi(2) = c, pi(3) = a∅: 3→ a;
(8) pi(1) = c, pi(2) = c, pi(3) = a: 3→ c;
(9) pi(1) = c, pi(2) = c, pi(3) = c: 1→ a.
In Example 2 all activities are distinct. On the other hand, if all
activities are copyable, an individually stable outcome is guaran-
teed to exist. Moreover, we can adapt the result of Igarashi and
Elkind [10] for hedonic games and obtain an efficient algorithm for
computing an individually stable outcome.
THEOREM 4. Each instance of gGASP where each activity a ∈
A∗ is copyable and (N,L) is acyclic admits an individually stable
feasible assignment; moreover, such as assignment can be found in
polynomial time.
PROOF SKETCH. The algorithm is similar to the one for hedo-
nic games [10]. The basic idea is to create a rooted tree for each
connected component and construct an assignment for every sub-
tree in a bottom-up manner. When considering a subtree rooted at
player i, we start with the assignment obtained by combining the
previously constructed assignments for the subtrees rooted at the
children of i and assigning i to the void activity. We then let player
i join the most preferred activity among those to which she has an
IS deviation. After that we keep adding players to i’s coalition as
long as the resulting coalition remains feasible, the player being
added is willing to move, and such a deviation is acceptable for all
members of i’s coalition. Similarly to the proof in Theorem 1 of
Igarashi and Elkind [10], one can show that the resulting assignment
is individually stable.
In contrast, when activities are not copyable, finding an indi-
vidually stable feasible assignment is hard, even for very simple
social networks. Indeed, for every class of simple social networks
for which Igarashi et al. [11] show that finding a Nash stable out-
come is NP-complete, finding an individually stable outcome is
NP-complete as well. The proof of the following theorem is similar
to the proofs of the respective results of Igarashi et al. [11]: essen-
tially, we have to replace each instance of the stalker game in these
proofs with an instance of the game from Example 2.
THEOREM 5. Given an instance of gGASP whose underlying
graph is a path, a star, or has connected components whose size is
bounded by a constant, it is NP-complete to determine whether it
has an individually stable feasible assignment.
Moreover, the problem of finding individually stable feasible
assignments remains hard even if the number of activities is small,
and even if the social network is a clique. The proof if similar to
that of Theorem 2 and is omitted due to space constraints.
THEOREM 6. The problem of determining whether an instance
of gGASP admits an individually stable assignment is W[1]-hard
with respect to the number of activities, even if the underlying graph
G = (N,L) is a clique.
However, just as in the case of Nash stability, if we both restrict
the structure of the social network and assume that the number of
activities is small, we can obtain positive algorithmic results. The
proof of the next theorem is similar to that of Theorem 1; again, we
omit it due to space constraints.
THEOREM 7. The problem of deciding whether an instance of
gGASP with |A∗| = p whose underlying social network (N,L) is
acyclic has an individually stable feasible assignment and finding
one if it exists is in FPT with respect to p.
The results for individual stability presented so far indicate that
from the complexity perspective it is very similar to Nash stability.
However, it is not clear if the XP algorithm presented in Theorem 3
extends to individual stability. The difficulty is that, to determine
whether an agent i has an IS deviation to an activity a, it is not
sufficient to know how many players engage in a: knowing their
preferences is important to decide whether i’s deviation will be
vetoed by one of the players currently assigned to a. Another
important difference concerns copyable activities and games on
acyclic graphs: in this setting, individually stable outcomes always
exist (Theorem 4), whereas for Nash stable outcomes this is not the
case, as illustrated by the stalker game.
5. CORE STABILITY
Igarashi et al. [11] have demonstrated that the core can be empty
even for gGASPs on paths with 3 players and 2 activities. We
reproduce their example below.
EXAMPLE 3 ([11]). Consider a gGASP with N = {1, 2, 3},
A∗ = {a, b}, L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, where agents’ preferences
(i)i∈N are as follows:
1 : (b, 2) 1 (a, 3) 1 (a∅, 1)
2 : (a, 2) 2 (b, 2) 2 (a, 3) 2 (a∅, 1)
3 : (a, 3) 3 (b, 1) 3 (a, 2) 3 (a∅, 1)
It can be shown that this instance admits no core stable assignment
[11].
On the positive side, we can show that checking whether a given
feasible assignment is core stable is easy, irrespective of the struc-
ture of the social network. The proposition below generalizes Theo-
rem 11 of Darmann [5] and Theorem 12 of Igarashi et al. [11].
PROPOSITION 8. Given an instance (N, (i))i∈N , A, L) of
gGASP and a feasible assignment pi for that instance, we can decide
in polynomial time whether pi is core stable.
PROOF. Let A = A∗ ∪ {a∅} and let n = |N |. By scanning the
assignment pi and the players’ preferences, we can check whether pi
is individually rational. Now, suppose that this is the case. Then, for
each a ∈ A∗ and each s ∈ [n] we can check if there is a deviation
by a connected coalition of size s that engages in a. To this end,
we consider the set Sa,s of all players who strictly prefer (a, s) to
their assignment under pi and verify whether Sa,s has a connected
component of size at least s that contains pia; if this is the case,
pia (which is itself connected or empty) could be extended to a
connected coalition of size exactly s that strongly blocks pi. If no
such deviation exists, pi is core stable.
However, core stability turns out to be more computationally
challenging that Nash stability and individual stability when the
number of activities is small: we will now show that core stable
assignments are hard to find even if there are only two activities
and the underlying graph is a star (and thus one cannot expect an
FPT result with respect to the number of activities for this setting).
Later, we will see that this hardness result can be extended to the
case where (N,L) is a clique, i.e., to classic GASP, thereby solving
a problem left open by the work of Darmann [5].
THEOREM 9. It is NP-complete to determine whether an in-
stance of gGASP admits a core stable assignment even when the
underlying graph is a star and the number of non-void activities
is 2.
PROOF. Our problem is in NP by Proposition 8. To estab-
lish NP-hardness, we reduce from the NP-complete problem HIT-
TING SET [9]. An instance of HITTING SET is a family H =
{V1, V2, . . . , Vm} of subsets of a finite set V and an integer k with
k < |V |. It is a “yes”-instance if H admits a hitting set V ′ ⊆ V
of size at most k, i.e., |V ′| ≤ k and V ′ ∩ Vi 6= ∅ for each Vi ∈ H;
otherwise, it is a “no”-instance.
Given an instance of HITTING SET, we can create three disjoint
copies of (V,H): for each v ∈ V we create elements xv , yv and
zv , set W = {xv, yv, zv | v ∈ V } and for each i ∈ [m] we let
Xi = {xv | v ∈ Vi}, Yi = {yv | v ∈ Vi}, Zi = {zv | v ∈ Vi}
and set G = {Xi, Yi, Zi | i ∈ [m]}. In what follows, we will use
the fact that (W,G) admits a hitting set of size 3k if and only if
(V,H) admits a hitting set of size 3.
Consider an instance (V,H, k) of HITTING SET and construct
the pair (W,G) as described above. For readability, we renumber
the elements of G as W1, . . . ,W3m.
We construct an instance of gGASP as follows. We define the
set of activities to be A∗ = {a, b}. We introduce a center player
c, two players s1 and s2, and a player w for each w ∈ W . Also,
for each i ∈ [3m], we let ti = i + |W | + 1 and create a set
Di = {d(1)i , d(2)i , . . . , d(ti−|Wi|−1)i } of dummy players. We then
attach s1, s2, each player w ∈ W and each of the dummies to the
center. Formally, the graph (N,L) is given by
N = {c, s1, s2} ∪W ∪
3m⋃
i=1
Di and L = { {c, x} | x ∈ N \ {c} }.
Intuitively, for each i ∈ [3m] the number ti is the target coalition
size when all players in Wi are engaged in activity b, together with
c and the players in Di.
The agents’ preferences over alternatives are defined as follows.
We let A′ = {a} × [4, 3k + 3]. For each w ∈ W , we let Bw =
{b}×|{ ti | w ∈Wi }|; also, setB = ⋃w∈W Bw . The preferences
of each player w ∈W are given by
w : A′  Bw  (a∅, 1).
For each i ∈ [3m] the dummy players in Di only approve the
alternative (b, ti). The preferences of the center player c are given
by
c : (a, 2)  (b, 2)  (a, 3)  B  A′  (a∅, 1).
Finally, the preferences of players s1 and s2 are given by
s1 : A
′  (b, 2)  (a, 3)  (a∅, 1)
s2 : A
′  (a, 3)  B  (b, 1)  (a, 2)  (a∅, 1).
Note that the preferences of c, s1 and s2, when restricted to A ×
[1, 2, 3], form an instance of gGASP with an empty core (Exam-
ple 3).
We will show that (V,H) admits a hitting set of size at most k if
and only if there exists a core stable feasible assignment.
Let V ′ be a hitting set of size at most k in (V,H). Set W ′ =
{xv, yv, zv | v ∈ V ′}; we have |W ′| ≤ 3k, and, by construction,
W ′ is a hitting set for (W,G). Then, we construct a feasible assign-
ment pi by assigning activity a to c, s1, s2, and the players w ∈W ′,
and assigning the void activity to the remaining players. Clearly,
pi is individually rational, since (a, |W ′| + 3) ∈ A′. Further, no-
tice that no connected subset S together with activity a strongly
blocks pi: every such subset has to contain players s1 and s2, who
are currently enjoying one of their top alternatives. It remains to
show that no connected subset S together with activity b strongly
blocks pi. Suppose towards a contradiction that such a subset S
exists; as s1 and s2 are not interested in deviating, it must be the
case that |S| = ti for some i ∈ [3m] and hence S consists of agents
who approve (b, ti), i.e., S = {c} ∪Wi ∪Di for some i ∈ [3m].
However, since W ′ is a hitting set, there is an agent j ∈W ′ ∩Wi
with pi(j) = a, and this agent prefers (a, |W ′| + 3) to (b, ti), a
contradiction. Hence, pi is core stable.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a core stable feasible assign-
ment pi and let W ′ = {w ∈W | pi(w) = a }.
We will first argue that pi(c) = a. Indeed, if pi(c) = a∅, then
pia = ∅ and agents c, s1 and s2 can deviate to a. If pi(c) = b and
the only other agent to engage in b is s1, then pia = ∅ and c and s2
can deviate to a. If pi(c) = b and |pib| = ti for some i ∈ [m] then
pia = ∅, and c, s1 and s2 can deviate to a. It follows that pi(c) = a.
Now, if pia = {c, s2} then pib = ∅ and agent s2 can deviate to b.
Similarly, if pia = {c, s1, s2} then pib = ∅, and c and s1 can deviate
to b. If follows that |pia| ∈ [4, 3k + 3] and hence |W ′| ≤ 3k + 2;
also, either pib = {s2} or pib = ∅. Now, if W ′ is not a hitting
set for (W,G), there exists a set Wi ∈ G such that all players in
Wi are assigned to the void activity. Then if pib = ∅ the coalition
{c} ∪Wi ∪Di together with the activity b strongly blocks pi, and
if pib = {s2} the coalition {c, s2} ∪Wi ∪ Di \ {d(1)i } together
with the activity b strongly blocks pi. In either case, we obtain a
contradiction with the stability of pi. Thus, W ′ is a hitting set for
(W,G). At least one of the three sets X ′ = {xv | xv ∈ W ′},
Y ′ = {yv | yv ∈ W ′}, and Z′ = {zv | zv ∈ W ′} contains at
most k elements; assume without loss of generality that |X ′| ≤ k.
By construction, {v ∈ V | xv ∈ X ′} is a hitting set for (V,H).
Thus, (V,H) admits a hitting set of size at most k, which is what
we wanted to prove.
The hardness result in Theorem 9 immediately generalizes to
instances of gGASP with more than two activities: we can modify
the construction in our hardness reduction by introducing additional
activities that no player wants to engage in.
Also, Theorem 9 can be extended from stars to cliques; however,
our proof for cliques relies on having at least four non-void activities.
It remains an interesting open problem whether core stable outcomes
of gGASPs on cliques can be found efficiently if the number of
activities does not exceed 3. We conjecture that the answer is ‘no’,
i.e., the problem of computing core stable outcomes remains NP-
hard for |A∗| = 2, 3.
THEOREM 10. It is NP-complete to determine whether an in-
stance of gGASP admits a core stable assignment even when the
underlying graph is a clique and the number of activities is 4.
In contrast, checking the existence of core stable assignments in
gGASP is easy if |A∗| = 1, irrespective of the structure of the social
network.
PROPOSITION 11. Every instance of gGASP with A = {a, a∅}
admits a core stable assignment; moreover, such an assignment can
be computed in polynomial time.
PROOF. Consider an instance (N, (i))i∈N , A, L) of gGASP
with A = {a, a∅}, and let n = |N |. For each s ∈ [n], let Ss be
the set of all players who weakly prefer (a, s) to (a∅, 1). If for
each s ∈ [n] the largest connected component of Ss with respect
to (N,L) contains fewer than s agents, then no outcome in which
a non-empty set of agents engages in a is individually rational,
whereas the assignment pi given by pi(i) = a∅ for all i ∈ N is core
stable. Otherwise, consider the largest value of s such that Ss has
a connected component of size at least s. Find a connected subset
of Ss of size exactly s, and assign the agents in this subset to a;
assign the remaining agents to a∅. To see that this assignment is
core stable, note that for every deviating coalition S we would have
|S| > s, and hence such a coalition is either disconnected or some
players in S prefer (a∅, 1) to (a, |S|).
It is not clear if the problem of finding core stable assignments
in gGASP is in FPT with respect to the number of activities when
the underlying graph is a path. However, we can place this problem
in XP with respect to this parameter. In fact, we have the following
more general result for graphs with few connected coalitions (see
the work of Elkind [8] for insights on the structure of such graphs).
PROPOSITION 12. Given an instance (N, (i))i∈N , A, L) of
gGASP with |N | = n, |A| = p + 1, such that the number of
non-empty connected subsets of (N,L) is κ, we can decide in time
O(κp) · poly(n, p) whether this instance admits a core stable as-
signment, and find one such assignment if it exists.
PROOF. Let C1, . . . , Cκ be the list of all non-empty connected
subsets of (N,L). Since each assignment of players to activities
has to assign a connected (possibly empty) subset of players to
each activity, we can bound the number of possible assignments by
(κ+1)p: each of the p non-void activities is assigned to a coalition in
our list or to no player at all, and the remaining players are assigned
the void activity. We can then generate all these assignments one by
one and check if any of them is core stable; by Proposition 8, the
stability check can be performed in time polynomial in n and p.
If the social network (N,L) is a path, it has O(|N |2) connected
subsets. Thus, we obtain the following corollary.
COROLLARY 13. The problem of deciding whether a given in-
stance of gGASP whose underlying graph is a path admits a core
stable assignment is in XP with respect to the number of activities.
6. FEW PLAYERS
In the previous sections, the parameter that we focused on was
the number of activities p. Although we expect this parameter to
be small in many realistic settings, there are also situations where
players can choose from a huge variety of possible activities. It
is then natural to ask if stability-related problems for gGASPs are
tractable in the number of players n is small. This is the question
that we consider in this section.
We first observe that for all stability concepts considered in this
paper the problem of finding a stable feasible assignment is in XP
with respect to n: we can simply guess the activity of each player
(there are at most (p+ 1)n possible guesses) and check whether the
resulting assignment is feasible and stable.
OBSERVATION 14. The problem of deciding whether a given
instance of gGASP admits a core stable, Nash stable, or individually
stable assignment is in XP with respect to the number of players n.
The following theorem shows that gGASP is unlikely to be fixed-
parameter tractable with respect to n. This is somewhat surprising,
because an FPT algorithm with respect to n could afford to iterate
through all possible partitions of the players into coalitions. In-
terestingly, in the following hardness reduction there is a unique
partition of players into coalitions that can lead to a stable assign-
ment; that is, computational hardness comes solely from assigning
known coalitions of players to activities.
THEOREM 15. The problem of determining whether an instance
of gGASP whose underlying graph is a clique admits a core stable
(Nash stable, or individually stable) assignment is W[1]-hard with
respect to the number of players n.
PROOF. Due to space constraints, we only provide a proof for
Nash stability. We describe a parameterized reduction from the
W[1]-hard MULTICOLORED CLIQUE problem. An instance of this
problem is given by an undirected graph G = (V,E), a positive
integer h ∈ N, and a vertex coloring φ : V → {1, 2, . . . , h}. It is a
‘yes’-instance if G admits a colorful h-clique, that is, a size-h vertex
subset Q ⊆ V such that the vertices in Q are pairwise adjacent and
have pairwise distinct colors. Without loss of generality, we assume
that there are exactly q vertices of each color for some q ∈ N, and
that there are no edges between vertices of the same color.
Let (G, h, φ) be an instance of MULTICOLORED CLIQUE with
G = (V,E). For every i ∈ [h], we write V (i) = {v(i)1 , . . . , v(i)q }
to denote the set of vertices of color i. For each vertex v, we write
E(v) = {e(v)1 , . . . , e(v)|E(v)|} to denote the set of edges incident
to v. We construct our gGASP instance as follows. We have one
vertex activity a(i)` for each vertex v
(i)
` ∈ V (i), i ∈ [h], one edge
activity b(v)` for each edge e
(v)
` ∈ E, two color activities ci and c′i
for each color i ∈ [h], and one colorpair activity ci,j for each color
pair i, j ∈ [h], i 6= j.
Idea. We will have one color gadget for each color i ∈ [h] and
one colorpair gadget for each color pair {i, j}, i 6= j. For most of
the possible assignments, these gadgets will be unstable, unless the
following holds:
1. For each color i ∈ [h] the first two players from the color
gadget select a vertex of color i (by being assigned together
to the corresponding vertex activity).
2. For each color pair {i, j} ∈ [h], i 6= j the first two players of
the colorpair gadget select an edge connecting one vertex of
color i and one vertex of color j (by being assigned together
to the corresponding edge activity).
3. Every selected edge for the color pair {i, j} must be incident
to both vertices selected for color i and color j.
If the three conditions above hold, then the assignment must encode
a colorful h-clique.
Construction details. The color gadget C(i), i ∈ [h] consists of
the following four players.
p
(i)
1 : (a
(i)
1 , 2)  B(1, i, 3)  (a(i)2 , 2)  B(2, i, 3) 
· · ·  (a(i)q , 2)  B(q, i, 3)  (ci, 1)  (a∅, 1)
p
(i)
2 : (a
(i)
q , 2)  B(q, i, 3)  (a(i)q−1, 2)  B(q − 1, i, 3) 
· · ·  (a(i)1 , 2)  B(1, i, 3)  (c′i, 1)  (a∅, 1)
p
(i)
3 : (ci, 2)  (a∅, 1)
p
(i)
4 : (c
′
i, 2)  (a∅, 1)
with B(`, i, z) = (b
(v
(i)
`
)
1 , z)  (b
(v
(i)
`
)
2 , z) · · ·  (b
(v
(i)
`
)
|E(v(i)
`
)|
, z)
The colorpair gadget C({i, j}), {i, j} ⊆ [h], i 6= j, consists of
three players. Players p{i,j}1 and p
{i,j}
2 approve all edge activities
corresponding to edges between vertices of color i and j with size
two and the colorpair activity ci,j with size two and one, and strictly
prefer the former alternatives to the latter. Player p{i,j}3 approves
only the colorpair activity ci,j with size three.
Correctness. We will now argue that the graphG admits a colorful
clique of size h if and only if our instance of gGASP admits a Nash
stable assignment.
Suppose that there exists a colorful cliqueH of size h. Assign the
first two players of the color gadget C(i) to the activity correspond-
ing to the vertex of color i from H . Assign the first two players of
the colorpair gadget C({i, j}) to the activity corresponding to the
edge between the vertices of color i and j in H . Assign all other
players to the void activity. Clearly, the resulting assignment is
feasible. Observe that for a successful Nash deviation a player must
join an existing non-empty coalition, because no player prefers a
size-one activity to the currently assigned one. By construction, the
last two players of each color gadget and the last player of the color-
pair gadget cannot deviate (no other players engage in an approved
activity). Consider the first two players of color gadget C(i). They
cannot deviate to a vertex activity, because their current activity is
their only approved vertex activity that has some players assigned
to it. They cannot deviate to an edge activity either, because they
would only prefer edge activities corresponding to edges that are
not incident to the vertex of color i that is part of colorful clique H;
these activities, however, have no players assigned to them. Finally,
the first two players of a colorpair gadget C({i, j}) cannot deviate
since no player is assigned to any of their more preferred activities.
Thus, we have a Nash stable feasible assignment.
Suppose that there exists a Nash stable feasible assignment pi.
Observe that the first two players of each colorpair gadget C({i, j})
are assigned to the same edge activity corresponding to some edge
e`i,j ∈ E. Otherwise, they would need to be assigned to the
colorpair activity ci,j and be stalked by the third player of the
gadget (similarly to the Stalker game from Example 1). We say that
these players “select edge e`i,j ”. By similar reasoning the first two
players of each color gadget C(i) are assigned to the same vertex
activity corresponding to some vertex v(i)`i . They cannot be assigned
to an edge activity, because the third player would necessarily be
a player from a colorpair gadget, and these players do not want to
engage in activities with two other players. We say that these players
“select vertex v(i)`i ”. (Note that at this point, the coalition structure
of any stable outcome is already fixed: The first two players of each
color gadget and of each colorpair gadget must form a coalition of
size two, respectively, and all other players must be assigned to the
void activity.)
Now, assume towards a contradiction that the selected vertices
and edges do not form a colorful clique of size h. The size and
colorfulness are clear from the construction. Hence, there must
be some pair {v(i)`i , v
(j)
`j
} of selected vertices that is not adjacent.
However, this would imply that colorpair gadget {i, j} selected
an edge that is either not incident to vertex v(i)`i or not incident to
vertex v(j)`j . Without loss of generality let it be non-adjacent to
vertex v(i)`i . Now, there are two cases. First, if e`i,j ∈ E(v
(i)
x ) with
x < `i, then player p
(i)
1 would deviate to the activity corresponding
to e`i,j . Second, if e`i,j ∈ E(v(i)x ) with x > `i, then player p(i)2
would deviate to the activity corresponding to e`i,j . In both cases
we have a contradiction to the assumption that pi is Nash stable.
Note that although we showed W[1]-hardness for each of the
parameters p and n, parameterizing by the combined parameter p+n
immediately gives fixed-parameter tractability, since the input size
is trivially upper-bounded by n2 · p.
7. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the parameterized complexity of computing
stable outcomes of group activity selection problems on networks,
with respect to two natural parameters. Many of our hardness results
hold for the classic GASP problem, where there are no constraints
on possible coalitions; however, some of our positive results only
hold for acyclic graphs. Interestingly, one of our tractability results
holds for GASPs, but it is not clear if it can be extended to gGASPs;
thus, while simple networks may decrease complexity, allowing for
arbitrary networks may have the opposite effect.
In some of our hardness reductions players have non-strict pref-
erences. In some cases, it is easy to modify our gadgets to rely on
strict preferences only; in other cases (notably, in individual stability
proofs) our arguments make crucial use of indifferences.
Confirming our intuition, we showed that finding core stable
assignments tends to be computationally more difficult than finding
Nash stable or individually stable assignments; we note that this
distinction only becomes visible from the parameterized complexity
perspective, as all of these problems are NP-hard.
Our results for games with few players are somewhat preliminary:
we have only investigated the complexity of our problems with
respect to this parameter for general networks and for cliques, and
have not considered simple networks such as stars and paths. These
questions offer an interesting direction for future work.
REFERENCES
[1] N. Alon, R. Yuster, and U. Zwick. Color-coding. J. ACM,
42(4):844–856, July 1995.
[2] C. Ballester. NP-competeness in hedonic games. Games and
Economic Behavior, 49:1–30, 2004.
[3] G. Chalkiadakis, G. Greco, and E. Markakis. Characteristic
function games with restricted agent interactions:
Core-stability and coalition structures. Artificial Intelligence,
232:76–113, 2016.
[4] M. Cygan, F. V. Fomin, L. Kowalik, D. Lokshtanov, D. Marx,
M. Pilipczuk, M. Pilipczuk, and S. Saurabh. Parameterized
Algorithms. Springer Publishing Company, Incorporated, 1st
edition, 2015.
[5] A. Darmann. Group activity selection from ordinal
preferences. In Proceedings of the 4th International
Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2015,
pages 35–51, 2015.
[6] A. Darmann, E. Elkind, S. Kurz, J. Lang, J. Schauer, and
G. Woeginger. Group activity selection problem. In
Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Internet
and Network Economics, WINE 2012, pages 156–169, 2012.
[7] G. Demange. On group stability in hierarchies and networks.
Journal of Political Economy, 112(4):754–778, 2004.
[8] E. Elkind. Coalitional games on sparse social networks. In
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Internet
and Network Economics, WINE 2014, pages 308–321, 2014.
[9] M. Garey and D. Johnson. Computers and Intractability: A
Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness. W. H. Freeman and
Company, 1979.
[10] A. Igarashi and E. Elkind. Hedonic games with
graph-restricted communication. In Proceedings of the 15th
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016, pages 242–250, 2016.
[11] A. Igarashi, D. Peters, and E. Elkind. Group activity selection
on social networks. In Proceedings of the 31st AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017, 2017.
Accepted for publication. Long version available as
arXiv:1611.04524 [cs.GT].
[12] R. B. Myerson. Graphs and cooperation in games.
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2(3):225–229, 1977.
